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Anosognosia for motor impairment has been linked to lesions of the right hemisphere. However, left
hemisphere damaged patients have often been excluded from investigation because of their associated
language deficits. In this study we assessed anosognosia for motor disorders in a group of left hemisphere
damaged patients using 2 tools that assess the presence of unawareness—a structured interview that is a
common method of assessment of anosognosia in clinical settings, and a new tool, the Visual-Analogue
Test for Anosognosia for Motor Impairment (VATAm; Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin, & Cameron, in
press). The structured interview relies heavily on language and enquires about general motor ability
whereas the VATAm is less dependent on language abilities and enquires about specific motor tasks.
Results suggest that the frequency of anosognosia in left brain damaged patients may have been
underestimated due to methodological reasons, and that anosognosia for motor impairment can also be
associated with lesions of the left hemisphere.
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Anosognosia for motor impairment is considered to be a rare
occurrence following left hemisphere damage (Adair, Schwartz, &
Barrett, 2003; Cutting, 1978; Nathanson, Bergman, & Gordon,
1952; Stone, Halligan, & Greenwood, 1993; see Vuilleumier,
2004, for a review). Its frequency in the acute phase has been
estimated as less than 4% (Baier & Karnath, 2005). In a study
using injection of barbiturate (Wada test), Gilmore, Heilman,
Schmidt, Fennell, and Quisling (1992) found that none of the eight
participants showed unawareness following suppression of left
hemisphere activity, reinforcing the idea that the left hemisphere
plays little role in awareness for motor disorders. As a result,
unawareness for right motor impairment has received very little
attention. This has strong implications for theories of anosognosia,
which have to account for this hemispheric asymmetry. For ex-
ample, the motivational approach (Weinstein, 1991; Weinstein &
Kahn, 1955) suggests that anosognosia for motor impairment
reflects a psychological reaction to an unbearable reality. How-
ever, this account has been dismissed, mainly on the basis that it
fails to explain why right, as opposed to left, hemiplegia rarely
triggers the psychological mechanism of denial (e.g., Bisiach &
Geminiani, 1991; Heilman, 2007). Therefore, the few attempts to
reinterpret this psychodynamic approach of anosognosia have as-
sumed deficits of specific right-sided monitoring (Venneri &
Shanks, 2003) or emotion-regulation systems (Turnbull & Solms,
2007a, 2007b).
Studies using the Wada test that were carried out with a large
group of volunteers (e.g., Dywan, McGlone, & Fox, 1995) showed
a different pattern of results (see Table 1). Despite a trend toward
a higher frequency of anosognosia following suppression of right
hemisphere activity, presence of unawareness following suppres-
sion of left hemisphere activity ranged from 49% (Breier et al.,
1995) to 86% (Durkin, Meador, Nichols, Lee, & Loring, 1994).
Why, then, is unawareness among left brain damaged patients so
rarely reported? A possible reason is a methodological bias. The
typical methods used to assess anosognosia for motor impairment
are structured interviews (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, &
Berti, 1986; Cutting, 1978; Nathanson et al., 1952; Stone et al.,
1993; see also Jehkonen, Laihosalo, & Kettunen, 2006, Tables 1
and 4), sometimes in conjunction with verbal estimates of motor
ability (Berti, La`davas, & Della Corte, 1996; Marcel, Tegne´r, &
Nimmo-Smith, 2004). These types of assessment rely heavily on
the patient’s language skills, resulting in the exclusion of left
hemisphere damaged patients who may present with severe lan-
guage deficits. The rate of exclusion of aphasics has been relatively
high, ranging from 38% in Nathanson et al.’s (1952) study, to 48%
in Stone et al.’s (1993) study and to 60% in Cutting’s (1978) study.
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Unfortunately, no information is available about the exclusion rate
of left hemisphere damaged patients in other studies (Baier &
Karnath, 2005; Berti et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2004). Data related
to exclusion rates are particularly interesting considering that
“there is no way of knowing whether the patients with global
aphasia denied their deficits or not” (Nathanson et al., 1952, p.
383), and “that right hemiplegics at risk for developing anosog-
nosia were the very patients in whom aphasia precluded its deter-
mination” (Cutting, 1978, p. 548). Hence, as recently suggested by
Jehkonen et al. (2006) in their meta-analysis on anosognosia, there
is a need to develop methods of assessment that rely less on verbal
forms of communication.
In addition, some methods appear to be more sensitive in de-
tecting lack of awareness. Frequency of anosognosia for motor
impairment has been found much higher when, rather than enquir-
ing about a general condition, patients were asked to estimate their
ability in performing specific (bimanual) tasks (Marcel et al.,
2004). However, the rating method also relies on patients’ lan-
guage ability.
It is therefore possible that by using a highly sensitive method to
assess unawareness, and by finding an appropriate means of in-
cluding aphasic patients, it should be possible to more effectively
assess the presence of anosognosia for right motor disorders.
In this paper, we evaluated the presence of unawareness in a
group of left hemisphere damaged patients using two different
methods. The first is a classic structured interview that is often
used both for research purposes and in the clinical setting (Berti et
al., 1996). It enquires about general conditions and requires a
relatively high degree of language skills. The other is a newly
devised Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for Motor Impair-
ment (VATAm; Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin, & Cameron, in
press; see also http://homepages.gold.ac.uk/gcocchini/; to view
and download the test). The VATAm assesses patients’ awareness
of their ability to perform specific motor tasks. It includes nonver-
bal stimuli to facilitate comprehension, a rating scale to encourage
nonverbal responses, and control items to establish the reliability
of patients’ responses.
This study is not aimed at providing epidemiological data,
instead it aims to investigate whether anosognosia for motor dis-
orders following left brain damage could have been underesti-
mated in the past.
Method
Participants
Forty-two left hemisphere damaged (LHD) patients were con-
sidered in the study according to the following inclusion criteria:
(a) younger than 90 years of age; (b) no known psychiatric prob-
lems prior to brain damage; (c) evidence of recent vascular uni-
lateral lesion on CT scan; (d) presence of motor impairment as
detected by the Standard Neurological Examination for upper and
lower limbs (Bisiach et al., 1986). Scores for each limb ranged
from 0 (normal motor performance) to 3 (complete plegia). Scores
of 1 and 2 were given for mild and moderate motor impairment,
respectively. Poor performance on this test due to apraxia, tremor,
or ataxia was not considered as evidence of motor impairment.
Nine patients (i.e., 21%) were excluded from the study because
their severe language difficulties precluded comprehension of the
test. Therefore 33 patients (17 women and 16 men) entered the
study. Their mean age was 69.7 (SD  11.8; range  42 to 87)
with an average formal education of 9.1 year (SD 4.6; range 2
to 19). The average motor impairment score was 2.2 (SD  0.9;
range  0 to 3) and 2.1 (SD  0.8; range  1 to 3) for upper and
lower limb, respectively. A subgroup of 14 patients showed com-
plete plegia (i.e., score  3) either in both limbs (9 patients) or for
upper limb only (5 patients—whose lower limb score  2). On
average, patients were recruited for this study 73.8 days
(SD  46.0; range  7 to 210) after brain damage. Seven patients
were recruited during the acute phase (i.e., between 7 and 30 days
postonset), 7 patients were recruited during the subacute phase
(i.e., 31 to 60 days), and 19 patients were recruited during the
chronic phase (i.e., 61 to 210 days).
For each patient, at least one caregiver was asked to participate
in the study and provided information about the patient’s motor
disorders. All participants gave informed consent prior to their
participation in the study. Examiners were informed that a new
diagnostic tool to assess anosognosia was being piloted, but they
were blind to the actual experimental hypotheses.
Anosognosia Assessment
Structured Interview
Patients were asked about their current condition, and about
their motor abilities for upper limb. Questions were taken from
Berti et al. (1996). In the first set of questions patients were asked:
“Where are we? Why are you in hospital? How is your right arm?
Can you move it?” If the patient answered “no” to the last ques-
tion, then she/he was asked “Why can’t you move your right arm?”
If the patient denied the motor impairment, she/he was asked to
“Please, touch my hand with your right hand.” The patient was
then asked “Have you done it?” If the patient answered “no,” then
she/he was asked “Why haven’t you done it?” If the patient
answered “I did” (i.e., she/he can move it), then she/he was asked
“Are you sure? It is very strange because I have not seen your hand
touching my hand.” The total score indicating unawareness for
Table 1
Percentage of Volunteers Who Show Evidence of Unawareness
Following Suppression of Activity of Left and Right
Hemispheres (Wada Test)
Hemisphere
anaesthetised
nRight Left
Gilmore et al., 1992 100 0 8
Buchtel et al., 1992 92 57 48
Kaplan et al., 1993 100 71 15a
Durkin et al., 1994 94 86 115b
Dywan et al., 1995 66 66 83
Breier et al., 1995 89 49 54
Lu et al., 1997 80 59 17
a Of these 15 patients, 8 had right and 7 had left intracarotid injection. b All
115 participants were dextrals with left hemisphere dominance for language. In
a larger sample of 150 participants (regardless of hemisphere dominance for
language), anosognosia for motor impairment was found in 95% and 89% of
cases after right and left hemisphere injections, respectively.
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upper limb motor impairment ranged from 0 to 2. A score of 0 was
given if the patient acknowledged his or her motor impairment
(aware); a score of 1 was given if the patient did not acknowledge
his or her motor impairment but recognized that she/he had not
reached the examiner’s hand (mild anosognosia); a score of 2 was
given if the patient denied motor impairment even after she/he
failed to reach the examiner’s hand (severe anosognosia).
Patients were also asked about the motor impairment of their
affected lower limb. First they were asked, “How is your right leg?
Can you move it?,” and then “Can you walk without any diffi-
culty?” Unawareness for lower limb motor impairment was indi-
cated by the final score (range 0 to 2). A score of 0 was given if
the patient either spontaneously reported his or her motor impair-
ment when first asked about the reasons for being in the hospital
(see above), or acknowledged the motor impairment when specif-
ically questioned (aware); a score of 1 was given if the patient
answered “fine” to the first question, but acknowledged the im-
possibility of walking (mild anosognosia); a score of 2 was given
when the patient claimed to be able to walk (severe anosognosia).
Examiners were instructed to repeat the questions if necessary.
The entire interview was administered despite possible associated
communication difficulties. Patients’ responses were considered
unreliable when responses could not be clearly classified due to
communication difficulties or when no reply could be obtained.
These interviews were excluded from the study.
VATAm
Patients were asked to rate their motor abilities on simple tasks
(e.g., climbing stairs) using a questionnaire that comprised draw-
ings to illustrate each question. Della Sala et al. (in press) reported
the norms for this test and observed that, in accordance with the
literature (e.g., Cutting, 1978; Stone et al., 1993), 42% of right
hemisphere damaged (RHD) patients showed some form of
anosognosia for their motor impairment. This demonstrates that
the VATAm is no more likely to elicit false positives than other
available anosognosia assessments, including structured inter-
views.
The VATAm was piloted with people with aphasia, who helped
to refine the drawings in terms of content and clarity. Often,
minimal verbal stimuli consisting of the action alone, rather than a
whole sentence, were presented to simplify and minimize the
language structure. The examiner emphasized that the questions
were about “you” (the patient) and about “now” (not related to
premorbid condition) using gesture and pointing if necessary to
make this clear. The practice item allowed further explanation, and
repetition if required.
The test comprised 12 questions about the patient’s ability to
perform tasks that require the use of both hands (8 questions) or
both feet (4 questions; “bilateral tasks”; e.g., walking; see the
Appendix). The patients were asked to rate their ability using a
4-point visual-analogue scale. A rating of 0 indicated (no problem
in carrying out the task) and a rating of 3 indicated (major
difficulty or impossibility in carrying out the task). Ratings be-
tween 0 and 3 were displayed along a continuum. At the
extremities of the continuum, there were written labels “no
problem” and “problem” together with a smiling or nonsmiling
face (see Figure 1). The format of the visual-analogue scale
(i.e., 0 on the left and 3 on the right) was used for the entire test
to avoid confusion across the trials. Patients rated their perfor-
mance using a verbal response (e.g., rating “3” or “Problem”) or
nonverbal response (i.e., pointing).
Four additional “check questions,” which elicit obvious answers
at either end of the continuum (fairly easy like “Do you have any
difficulty drinking from a glass?”; or more difficult like “Do you
have any difficulty juggling five balls in the air?”) were used to
assess comprehension of the questions, reliability of responses,
and to monitor any perseveration (see the Appendix). Ratings for
the check questions were not included in the total scoring of
anosognosia. However, participants who did not provide the ex-
pected answer (i.e., a rating of 0 or 1 for “easy” check questions
and a rating of 3 or 2 for “difficult” check questions, respectively)
to all check questions were excluded from further analyses. The
written questions, drawings, and rating scale were placed on the
ipsilesional side to avoid biases due to possible neglect and to
facilitate motor responses with the ipsilesional limb. The examiner
always ensured that the patients attended to the visual stimuli by
pointing to them while asking each question.1
For each patient, one or two caregivers (with a personal or a
professional relationship to the patient) were asked to rate the
patient’s motor capabilities using the same scale.
1 As part of a routine psychometric assessment, 4 patients showed clear
evidence of contralesional extrapersonal neglect on the Behavioural Inat-
tention Test (BIT; Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987). Three further
patients showed mild ipsilesional neglect in some subtests of the BIT; in
these cases the VATAm stimuli were displayed on the contralesional side.
Figure 1. Example of a VATAm question for bipedal motor task.
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VATAm score. The total rating of the VATAm (i.e., patient’s
self-rating and caregiver’s rating of the patient) ranged from 0
to 36. Each patient’s self-evaluation was then subtracted from that
of their caregiver. Where more than one caregiver rated a patient’s
motor skills, the patient’s final self-evaluation was compared with
the mean of the caregivers’ ratings. A previous study reporting
norms for the VATAm test (based on the discrepancy between 36
pairs of caregivers rating the motor performance of the same
patients; Della Sala et al., in press) suggested that a patient/
caregiver discrepancy equal to or higher than 6.3 should be con-
sidered as an indicator of unawareness. A discrepancy between 6.3
and 12.0 (i.e., average discrepancy for each question was no more
than 1 rating point) was deemed as evidence of “mild anosogno-
sia”; a value between 12.1 and 24.0 (i.e., average discrepancy for
each question between 1 and 2 rating points) indicated “moderate
anosognosia” and a value between than 24.1 and 36 (i.e., average
discrepancy for each question between 2 and 3 rating points)
indicated “severe anosognosia.”
As in the structured interview, examiners were instructed to
repeat questions if necessary. Patients’ responses were considered
unreliable when no response was given or when responses could
not be clearly classified due to communication difficulties. These
questionnaires were excluded from the study.
General Cognitive Assessment
Anosognosia for left hemplegia has occasionally been associ-
ated with personal neglect (Bisiach et al., 1986) so patients were
asked to perform the One Item Test (Bisiach et al., 1986). In this
test, patients are asked to reach their contralesional hand using
their ipsilesional one. Scores ranged from 0 (i.e., the patient
promptly reach for the target) to 1 (i.e., the target is reached with
hesitation and search), to 2 (i.e., the search is interrupted before
the target is reached), to 3 (i.e., no movement toward the target is
performed).
Anosognosia has also been associated with general impairment
in abstract thinking (Levine, Calvanio, & Rin, 1991), therefore
patients were asked to perform the vertical version of the Raven’s
Colored Matrices (Gainotti, D’Erme, Villa, & Caltagirone, 1986).
The scores range from 36 (i.e., all responses correct) to 0 (i.e., all
responses incorrect). Individual scores are adjusted by age and
education. A final score below 18 indicates an impairment of
abstract reasoning abilities (Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 1987).
Results
Structured Interview
In addition to the initial 9 patients who could not be assessed
(see above), a further 13 patients could not be tested using the
structured interview due to communication difficulties. Therefore,
a total of 22 out of 42 patients (52.4%) could not be assessed using
the structured interview. Presence and severity of anosognosia was
evaluated for the remaining 20 patients. Of these, 2 patients (10%)
showed anosognosia. They were assessed 50 and 70 days, respec-
tively after brain damage. One showed severe anosognosia (i.e.,
score  2) for the upper limb and mild anosognosia (i.e., score 
1) for the lower limb, whereas the other patient showed mild
anosognosia for both limbs. Both patients were part of the sub-
group of 14 patients (representing the 14.3% of the subgroup) with
complete paresis of at least one limb.
VATAm
In addition to the 9 patients who were initially excluded because
they were not able to be assessed, 3 further patients were excluded
because their data were not reliable (i.e., they responded incor-
rectly to at least one check question). Therefore, 12 of the 42
patients (28.6%) could not be assessed using the VATAm, and the
responses from 30 patients were considered in the final analyses.
Twelve of these (i.e., 40%) showed evidence of unawareness. Two
of them showed mild anosognosia, 7 moderate anosognosia, and 3
severe anosognosia. Motor impairment for patients showing mild,
moderate, and severe anosognosia was 1.5 (SD  .5, range 1 to
2), 2.3 (SD  .7, range  1 to 3), and 3 (SD  0), respectively for
upper limb; and 1.5 (SD  .5, range  1 to 2), 1.9 (SD  .8,
range  1 to 3), and 2.7 (SD  .5, range  2 to 3), respectively
for lower limb. The average time postonset of these 12 patients
was 104 days (SD  50.37, range  50 to 120). Two patients (1
with severe and 1 with moderate anosognosia) were in the sub-
acute phase, and the other 10 (2 with severe, 6 with moderate,
and 2 with mild anosognosia) were in the chronic phase.
Six of the 14 patients with complete paresis of at least one limb
(i.e., 43%) showed evidence of moderate (3 patients) or severe (3
patients) anosognosia.
Comparison Between the Structured Interview
and the VATAm
Only 10% of LHD patients showed anosognosia using the
structured interview assessment, but up to 40% showed evidence
of anosognosia using the VATAm. This difference is significant,
2(1, N  50)  5.36, p  .05.
Table 2 shows the percentages of aware, unaware, and excluded
patients according to the different methods of assessment. One-
third of the patients (31%) were classed as aware of their motor
disorders using both tests. Two patients (5%) were diagnosed as
anosognosic according to both tests (severe using the VATAm;
mild using the structured interview). Crucially there was evidence
of anosognosia in 5 patients (12%) using the VATm alone, and in 1
of these the level was severe. On the contrary, no patients were
classed as anosognosic using the structured interview alone. Fi-
Table 2
Number of Patients Who Were Excluded From the Study or
Classified as Aware/Unaware Using the VATAm and the
Structured Interview
Structured interview
VATAm Aware Unaware Exclusions Total
Aware 13 (31%) 0 (0%) 5 (12%) 18 (43%)
Unaware 5 (12%) 2 (5%) 5 (12%) 12 (29%)
Exclusions 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 12 (29%) 12 (29%)
Total 18 (43%) 2 (5%) 22 (52%)
Note. Percentages are calculated based on the entire group of 42 left
hemisphere damaged patients. VATAm  Visual-Analogue Test for
Anosognosia for Motor Impairment.
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nally, of the 22 patients who were excluded from the structured
interview, 5 (23%) showed evidence of anosognosia (moderate
in 4 patients and mild in 1) using the VATAm, but none of the
patients who were excluded from the VATAm could be assessed
using the structured interview.
Of the 14 patients with complete paresis, 5 could not be assessed
using the structured interview mainly due to their language defi-
cits, whereas 4 of them could be assessed using the VATAm. In
addition, only 2 of the 14 patients were considered to have anosog-
nosia when the structured interview was used (see Table 3),
whereas a further 4 were identified using the VATAm. These 4
patients were either excluded (3 patients) or considered aware
(1 patient) when the structured interview was used.
VATAm Test–Retest Reliability
Thirty caregivers and 21 patients were retested (between 24 hr
and 3 days later). Separated Pearson correlation analyses were
carried out for caregivers and patients. Both groups showed very
high correlation coefficients, that is, r  .961 ( p  .001) and r 
.932 ( p  .001), respectively.
Anosognosia and Brain Lesion
Neuroradiological scanning showed that 22 patients had isch-
emic lesions, 5 had hemorrhagic lesions, and 3 had both isch-
emic and hemorrhagic lesions. A recent literature review by Pia,
Neppi-Modona, Ricci, and Berti (2004) reported an increased
incidence of anosognosia when the lesion involved both parietal
and frontal lobes. Our study shows that 67% of the patients who
presented with anosognosia had lesions involving either the
frontal or parietal lobe or both, whereas only 39% of the
patients who were fully aware of their motor impairment
showed the same lesion pattern (see Table 4). However, the
association between lesions of the frontal and parietal lobes and
the presence of anosognosia was not significant, 2(1, N 
30)  1.3, ns.). Subcortical lesions (involving basal ganglia,
internal capsule, or the thalamus) were evident in 5 patients,
and 2 of them showed anosognosia. Karnath, Baier, and Nagele
(2005) claimed that the insular cortex may play a crucial role in
awareness; however the only patient (case n. 2) with a lesion of
this area alone did not show anosognosia. Vallar and Ronchi
(2006) suggested that this type of discrepancy might be due to
the inclusion of patients with mild forms of motor impairment.
We have therefore considered the 14 patients with complete
paresis separately (see Table 5). In accordance with Pia et al.’s
conclusions, all 6 anosognosic (moderate and severe) patients
within this subgroup had lesions in the fronto-parietal region,
however, the association between these sites of lesion and the
presence of anosognosia was not significant, 2(1, N 
14)  2.22, p  .136, ns.
Anosognosia and Neglect
One patient who showed anosognosia using the VATAm and 3
other patients who were fully aware of their motor impairments
were not tested for personal neglect. Eight anosognosic patients
and 12 patients who were aware of their motor impairment did not
show any signs of personal neglect (score 0). Two in each group
obtained a score of 1, one anosognosic patient obtained a score
of 2, and only one patient who was aware of his motor impairment
showed evidence of personal neglect (i.e., score  3). These data
confirm that anosognosia and personal neglect double dissociate
(e.g., Bisiach et al., 1986; Cutting, 1978; ), and suggest that
anosognosia could not be accounted for solely by concomitant
personal neglect.
Table 3
Structured Interview and VATAm Evaluation of Awareness in Patients With Complete Paresis
Patients
code
Standard neurological
examination for motor
impairmenta
Days from
onset Structured interview VATAm
Upper
limb
Lower
limb
3 3 3 30 Aware Aware
8 3 2 80 Excluded Moderate
10 3 3 90 Excluded Excluded
16 3 3 110 Excluded Moderate
20 3 3 60 Excluded Moderate
22 3 2 60 Aware Aware
23 3 3 70 Mild Severe
27 3 2 70 Mild/severeb Severe
28 3 2 30 Aware Aware
32 3 3 83 Aware Aware
35 3 3 94 Aware Severe
40 3 2 22 Excluded Aware
41 3 3 60 Aware Aware
42 3 3 120 Aware Aware
Note. N  14.
a Based on a scale ranging from 0 (normal) to 3 (complete paresis). b This patient showed mild anosognosia
for upper limb movement and severe anosognosia for lower limb movement.
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Anosognosia and Nonverbal Abstract Thinking
One patient did not complete the Colored Matrices. The average
score for anosognosic patients was 21.17 out of 36 (SD  6.99;
range  7 to 32), whereas the patients who were aware of their
motor impairment achieved an average score of 21.18 (SD 6.99;
range  8 to 30). A t test analysis confirmed no significant
difference, t(1)  .004, p  .997, ns. Four patients obtained a
pathological score, 1 of whom had anosognosia.
Discussion
Previous studies suggested that anosognosia following LHD is
uncommon (Baier & Karnath, 2005; Cutting, 1978; Marcel et al.,
2004; Nathanson et al., 1952; Stone et al., 1993), but the relatively
high rate of exclusion of LHD patients in previous studies and the
method of assessment may have led to the underestimation of the
frequency of unawareness for motor impairment among LHD
patients.
In accordance with the literature, a relatively high percentage of
LHD patients (52.4%) were excluded from the current study when
anosognosia was assessed using the structured interview. In con-
trast, the exclusion rate decreased considerably (28.6%) when the
VATAm was used. Because the examiners were not aware of the
specific experimental question of the study, possible examiner bias
cannot fully account for the relatively high number of patients who
were excluded using the structured interview. The VATAm en-
abled nearly half of the aphasic patients who were excluded using
the structured interview to be reliably assessed. The reasons for
the relatively high number of aphasics who were able to com-
plete the VATAm may be partly due to the nonverbal support
provided by the drawings, which facilitated comprehension, but
also to the response method, which allowed nonverbal responses
(i.e., pointing).
Anosognosia was found in a significantly higher percentage
(40%) of LHD patients when the VATAm was used in comparison
with the structured interview. In addition, when patients with
complete paresis were considered separately, the VATAm allowed
us to identify three times the number of patients with severe and
moderate degrees of anosognosia than the structured interview.
More interesting, 23% of patients, who could not be tested with the
structured interview, showed moderate or mild signs of anosog-
nosia using the VATAm.
This result may reflect a higher rate of false positives (i.e.,
patients incorrectly considered as unaware); or it may represent a
higher level of sensitivity of the VATAm in comparison with the
structured interview. There is some evidence to support the hy-
pothesis of increased sensitivity. First, in Della Sala et al.’s study
(in press) 41% of RHD patients showed some degree of anosog-
nosia when assessed using the VATAm. This falls within the
expected range of unawareness found in several other studies using
different methods of assessment (for a recent review, see Orfei et
al., 2007), and suggests that the VATAm does not overestimate
unawareness in the RBD group. Second, a diagnosis of anosog-
nosia using the VATAm was not just based on the arbitrary
examiner/caregiver’s judgment of lack of awareness. A clear cut-
off point has been identified to determine when the rating discrep-
ancy between caregiver and patient should be considered patho-
logical (norms in Della Sala et al., in press), and does not simply
reflect different individuals’ opinions. Third, the cut-off point and
the scoring system of the VATAm appear to be more rigorous than
those of the structured interview. In fact, minimal discrepancies
(i.e., below the cut-off) between the patient’s and the caregiver’s
ratings are acceptable and not interpreted as pathological. Only
two patients showed a mild form of anosognosia using the
VATAm; therefore, even if a very conservative criterion is adopted
(see Baier & Karnath, 2005, for a discussion on possible biases in
assessing the presence of mild forms of anosognosia), over 33% of
the LHD patients in the present study showed moderate or severe
anosognosia.
If aphasia is considered as the major reason for the different
sensitivity levels of the two tests, this could be addressed more
directly by devising, if possible, a nonverbal version of the struc-
tured interview. From the data that we collected, it seems that the
different sensitivity levels of the two methods used to assess
anosognosia, cannot be entirely explained by the nonverbal sup-
port provided by the VATAm. Indeed some severely anosognosic
patients (as indicated by the VATAm) could be assessed using the
structured interview. A possible reason for the higher sensitivity of
the VATAm might be due to the fact that the structured interview
enquires about general conditions (e.g., How is your arm?”),
Table 4
Number of Aware and Unaware Patients With Brain Lesions in
Specific Areas
Localization of the brain lesion
VATAm
Frontal and
parietal lobes
Frontal
lobe
Parietal
lobe Others Total
Aware 7 (39%) 2 (11%) 3 (17%) 6 (33%) 18 (100%)
Unaware 8 (67%) 0 (0%) 3 (25%) 1 (8%) 12 (100%)
Note. Percentages are calculated using the total number of aware and
total number of unaware patients.
Table 5
Site and Type of Brain Lesions of Patients With
Complete Paresis
Patients code Site of lesion Type of lesion
3 bg, ic I
8 FTP, ic H
10 PT I
16 FTP, ic I
20 FTP H
22 FTP I
23 FP I
27 FP H
28 FTP I
32 PO I
35 FTP I
40 FTP I
41 TPO I
42 FP I
Note. N  14. Patients showing moderate or severe anosognosia on the
Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for Motor Impairment are under-
lined. bg basal ganglia; ic internal capsule; I ischaemic; F frontal
lobe; P  parietal lobe; T  temporal lobe; O  occipital lobe; H 
haemorrhagic.
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whereas the VATAm focuses on specific motor activities. This is
supported by Marcel et al.’s (2004) findings that showed that the
frequency of anosognosia for motor impairment following RHD
was higher when patients were asked to estimate their ability to
perform specific (bimanual and bipedal) tasks similar to those in
the VATAm rather than when they were asked about their general
condition. This could be particularly important for subacute and
chronic patients (most of our LHD group) who are inevitably
exposed over time to numerous comments about their condition.
Patients may respond correctly to general questions about their
deficits, yet may still be unaware of their condition when asked to
evaluate their motor abilities in less common situations (see, e.g.,
Patient 35 reported in Table 3 for an illustration). Therefore, the
higher sensitivity of the VATAm in comparison with that of the
structured interview may be due to both decreased reliance on
verbal communication and to the specific methods used to inves-
tigate abilities/deficits.
The current data suggest that anosognosia for motor deficits
following LHD is a phenomenon that occurs more frequently than
has been previously reported. These findings are in accordance
with those studies that showed an association between inactivation
of the left hemisphere and anosognosia (e.g., Dywan et al., 1995),
and with recent neuroimaging studies that suggest that the left
hemisphere is definitively involved in tasks requiring self-evalua-
tion (Goldberg, Harel, & Malach, 2006; Lieberman, Jarcho, &
Satpute, 2004; see also Morin, 2007). In addition, our study mainly
comprised patients in the subacute and chronic phases, and our
findings suggest that anosognosia in less acute phases is not a rare
occurrence. This is in accordance with a substantial body of
literature that has described patients with anosognosia in subacute
and chronic phases (see Cocchini, Beschin, & Della Sala, 2002,
Table 1).
A wider issue should be considered. There is clear evidence that
damage to the right hemisphere leads to some degree of unaware-
ness, and several explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive,
have been proposed. Some authors have suggested that dysfunc-
tion of right brain areas may be responsible for monitoring the
veracity of mental contents (Venneri & Shanks, 2003). Turnbull
and Solms (2007a; see also Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005)
suggested that, in accordance with the motivational approach,
right-sided lesions may damage a right-sided emotion-regulation
system, therefore these patients may deny their deficits because
they have overwhelming difficulty in tolerating aversive emotional
states, such as paresis.
However, damage to the left hemisphere has also been consid-
ered to be responsible for lack of awareness of language deficits
(see Vuilleumier, 2000, for a review). Some authors have sug-
gested that unawareness of aphasia following LHD may result
from attentional or monitoring difficulties in comparing the actual
output with the intended output (e.g., Maher, Rothi, & Heilman,
1994; Marshall, Robson, Pring, & Chiat, 1998; Shuren, Hammond,
Maher, Rothi, & Heilman, 1995). In addition, if data from the
present study were replicated, then the major criticisms (e.g.,
Heilman, 2007) raised against some theoretical approaches of
anosognosia, such as the motivational theories, would not stand up
and such theoretical interpretations could be reconsidered.
We did not identify a clear association between anosognosia and
site of lesion, or between anosognosia and specific cognitive
deficits. The left hemisphere does appear to be involved in the
process of awareness of deficits, even though it may play a
different role to that of the right hemisphere. This is in line with the
growing opinion among researchers that anosognosia may be a
multifaceted phenomenon (Marcel et al., 2004), and that several
factors may underlie deficits of awareness (e.g., Cocchini et al.,
2002; Davies, Davies, & Coltheart, 2005; Marcel et al., 2004;
Orfei et al., 2007; Vuilleumier, 2004). Should this be the case, then
different types and aspects of anosognosia will be identified, and
diverse theoretical approaches could coexist in accounting for
different aspects of unawareness. It would therefore not be sur-
prising if, in accordance with our anatomical findings, the outcome
of meta-analysis studies does not support a definitive pattern of
brain lesions that are associated with anosognosia (e.g., Pia et al.,
2004).
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Appendix
VATAm Questions
Example: Do/would you have difficulty driving?
1. Do you have difficulty clapping your hands?
2. Do you have difficulty walking?
3. Do you have any difficulty washing your hands?
4. Check question: Do you have any difficulty jumping
over a lorry?
5. Do you have any difficulty washing the dishes?
6. Check question: Do you have any difficulty drinking
from a glass?
7. Do you have any difficulty putting on a pair of gloves?
8. Do you have any difficulty jumping?
9. Do you have any difficulty opening a jam jar?
10. Check question: Do you have any difficulty waving?
11. Do you have any difficulty climbing the stairs?
12. Do you have any difficulty opening a bottle?
13. Do you have any difficulty dealing a pack of cards?
14. Do you have any difficulty tying a knot?
15. Do you have any difficulty riding a bicycle?
16. Check question: Do you have any difficulty juggling
five balls in the air?
Expected ratings for check questions 4 and 16 are 2 or 3;
expected ratings for check questions 6 and 10 are 0 or 1.
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